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Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2] offers a long-term solution to establish information-
theoretically secure keys between two distant users. In practice, with a careful characterization
of quantum sources and the decoy-state method[3–5], measure-device-independent quantum key
distribution (MDI-QKD)[6] provides secure key distribution. While short-distance fibre-based QKD
has already been available for real-life implementation[7], the bottleneck of practical QKD lies on the
limited transmission distance. Due to photon losses in transmission, it was believed that the key gen-
eration rate is bounded by a linear function of the channel transmittance, O(η), without a quantum
repeater[8, 9], which puts an upper bound on the maximal secure transmission distance[10, 11]. In-
terestingly, a new phase-encoding MDI-QKD scheme, named twin-field QKD[12], has been suggested
to beat the linear bound, while another variant, named phase-matching quantum key distribution
(PM-QKD), has been proven to have a quadratic key-rate improvement[13, 14], O(
√
η). In reality,
however, the intrinsic optical mode mismatch of independent lasers, accompanied by phase fluc-
tuation and drift, impedes the successful experimental implementation of the new schemes. Here,
we solve this problem with the assistance of the laser injection technique and the phase post-
compensation method. In the experiment, the key rate surpasses the linear key-rate bound via 302
km and 402 km commercial-fibre channels, achieving a key rate over 4 orders of magnitude higher
than the existing results in literature[10]. Furthermore, with a 502 km ultralow-loss fibre, our system
yields a secret key rate of 0.118 bps. We expect this new type of QKD schemes to become a new
standard for future QKD.
In conventional point-to-point QKD, such as the BB84 protocol[1], the sender Alice encodes key information into
quantum states and sends them to the receiver Bob for detection. Whereas in MDI-QKD, Alice’s and Bob’s positions
are symmetric. They both send out encoded optical pulses to a measurement site owned by Charlie, who interferes the
pulses and publicly announces the results to correlate Alice’s and Bob’s key information. The security of MDI-QKD
does not depend on how Charlie realizes the measurement or announces the results. As a result, this scheme is immune
to all attacks on the detection and hence owns a higher security level in practice.
In quantum communication, attenuated lasers are widely used as photon sources, which can be described by weak
coherent states, |α〉 = e−|α|2/2∑∞k=0 αkk! |k〉, superpositions of k-photon states |k〉. The parameter α = √µeiφ is a
complex number, where µ = |α|2 is the light intensity and φ is the phase. In the original MDI-QKD[6], the user
encodes the key information into two weak coherent states on two orthogonal optical modes, such as polarization
encoding. In the security analysis, only the information carried by the single-photon states can be used for the final
key generation. The decoy-state method is widely employed to efficiently extract secret key information[3–5].
In reality, quantum information carriers, photons, can be easily lost during transmission. Define the transmittance
between Alice and Bob η to be the probability of a photon being successfully transmitted through the channel and
being detected. Hence, in the symmetric setting of MDI-QKD, the transmittance between Alice (Bob) and the
measurement site is
√
η. Only the detections, caused by Alice’s and Bob’s single-photon states, can be used for secure
key generation. Then such detection rate is given by O(η), as a natural upper bound of the key rate.
To achieve a better rate-transmittance performance, a new phase-encoding MDI-QKD scheme, named PM-QKD,
has been proposed, as shown in Fig. 1. Alice (Bob) encodes the key information into the phase of a coherent state
on a single optical mode. In this case, Charlie treats Alice and Bob’s two optical modes as one quantum system
and detects the relative phase between them. To do so, Charlie only needs one photon in the joint quantum system.
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2Therefore, the detection rate is O(
√
η). Strict security analysis shows that PM-QKD enjoys a quadratic improvement
on the rate-transmittance performance over the original MDI-QKD[13].
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FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of PM-QKD. Encoder is a device to modulate the intensity µ and phase φ of coherent states.
The beam splitter and the single photon detectors are used for interference detection. Divide the phases φ ∈ [0, 2pi) into D
slices, denoted by ∆j =
[
pi
D
(2j − 1), pi
D
(2j + 1)
)
with the index 0 ≤ j ≤ D − 1. In the experiment, we set D = 16. In each
round of key distribution, Alice encodes a random bit κa into her coherent state |√µaei(κapi+φa)〉, after adding an extra discrete
random phase φa = ja2pi/D which is at the center of jath phase slice ∆ja . Similarly, Bob encodes κb, µb, and φb on his pulse,
|√µbei(κbpi+φb)〉. Alice and Bob then send their pulses to Charlie, who is supposed to interfere these quantum states to measure
phase differences. After Charlie announces the detection results, Alice and Bob publicly announce the slice indexes ja, jb of
the random phases. They post-select the key bits κa, κb as the raw key, according to Charlie’s detection results and the sifting
scheme depending on ja, jb, with the phase post-compensation technique.
Despite the promising qualities of PM-QKD on both security and performance, the experimental implementation is
very challenging. In PM-QKD, the interference results at the measurement result should reflect the difference between
Alice’s and Bob’s encoded phases. In practice, an essential requirement is to match the phases of coherent states
generated by two remote and independent lasers. The coherent states of Alice |√µaei(κapi+φa)〉 and Bob |√µbei(κbpi+φb)〉
could have different phase references due to phase drift and fluctuation. Define the reference deviation φδ to be the
phase difference when both Alice and Bob set κa(b) = 0 and φa(b) = 0. There are three main factors determining the
value of φδ, fluctuations of the laser initial phases, fibre lengths, and laser frequencies. Take the 1550 nm telecom
light through a 200 km fibre for example, either a tiny change of transmission time, say by 10−15 s corresponding to
a 200 nm optical length, or a small deviation of the angular frequency, say by 1 kHz, will cause a significant phase
drift. Note that, there are several recent experiments which make efforts to deal with these challenges in order to
demonstrate the advantages of the new type of MDI-QKD schemes[15–18].
In this work, we implement PM-QKD with the setup shown in Fig. 2. In order to suppress the fluctuations of the
laser initial phases and frequencies, we employ the laser injection technique[19]. The setups on Alice’s and Bob’s sides
are exactly the same. Below, we take Alice’s side for example. The master laser in between Alice and Bob, with
3 kHz line-width and 1550.12 nm centre wavelength, emits a seed light which goes through a long fibre to lock Alice’s
distributed feedback laser. Alice’s laser generates optical pulses with a clock rate of 312.5 MHz. Two Sagnac rings are
employed to modulate pulses into four different intensities. The pulses with the largest intensity are used as reference
pulses for phase estimation, while the other three pulses are used as the signal state, weak decoy state, and vacuum
state to implement the decoy-state method. The extinction ratio between the signal state and the vacuum state is
about 20 dB. Two phase modulators are employed to modulate 16 different phases. Details of the laser injection
technique and the phase estimation are presented in Appendix A and B.
The pulses from Alice and Bob are transmitted through long optical fibres and interfered at the measurement site.
The interference results are detected by two superconducting nanowire single photon detectors. The dark count is
about 10 counts per second and the detector efficiency is about 40%. The total detection efficiency reduces to about
23% owing to 1.2 dB insertion loss and 25% non-overlapping between signal and detection windows. Two stabilization
systems are inserted before interference to filter out the noise caused by the nonlinear effect of the fibre and stabilizing
the incident pulses. Details of the implementation are presented in Appendix D.
Due to fibre fluctuation, there exists a slow phase drift between Alice and Bob. In the case when the phase fluctuates
slowly, pulses nearby share similar values of the reference deviation φδ. Inspired by this observation, we employ a simple
phase post-compensation technique[20]. During the experiment, Alice and Bob send reference pulses and quantum
pulses periodically. The reference pulse is typically more than one order of magnitude stronger than the quantum
pulse. They use reference pulses to estimate which slice jδ the reference deviation φδ lies in, according to interference
results. They use quantum pulses to perform the PM-QKD experiment. After obtaining measurement results, Alice
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FIG. 2. Experimental setup. a. The continuous-wave master laser (ML), used as the phase and wavelength reference,
are split by a polarization-maintaining beam splitter (PMBS2) and sent to Alice and Bob to lock their distributed feedback
(DFB) lasers, which act as slave lasers (SLs). Two stabilization systems (SS1 and SS2) are placed to enhance the interference
stability. Alice and Bobs pulses are interfered at PMBS1 and then detected by two superconducting nanowire single photon
detectors (SNSPD1 and SNSPD2). b. Stabilization system. The dense wavelength division multiplexer (DWDM) filters out
optical noises which disturb the detection results. A polarization beam splitter (PBS), an SNSPD, and an electric polarization
controller (EPC) are used to ensure that the polarization of the two pulses from Alice and Bob are indistinguishable. c.
Quantum source. Alice (same as Bob) injects the seed light from the ML, which is filtered by the fibre Bragg grating (FBG),
into her local DFB laser as the slave laser (SL). The SL generates pulses, which are split by the PMBS. One of the output
pulses goes to the encoder and the other is monitored by a photoelectric diode (PD). The encoder is composed of two Sagnac
rings (SR1 and SR2) for modulating intensities and two phase modulators (PM1 and PM2) for encoding phases. A circulator
(Circ3) is placed to isolate the source from the channel. The electrical variable optical attenuator (EVOA) reduces the pulse
intensity down to the single-photon level. d. Sagnac ring. An SR includes a Circ, a PMBS, a PM, and optical fibre. The
length difference between the optical fibre connected the output and input of the phase modulators are delicately designed to
meet two times of the repetition frequency of the pulses.
and Bob publicly announce the random phase slices ja, jb of the signal pulses. They calculate js = ja− jb+ jδ for raw
key sifting, where jδ works as the post-compensation shift. Clearly, if jδ accurately reflects the real-time reference
deviation of the system, perfect interference will happen when js = 0 or js = 8. Note that the estimated phase slice
indexes jδ are only used in the post-processing, which frees us from active phase locking during the state transmission.
Furthermore, compared with active locking, where the phase can only be locked well when φδ keeps stable during the
whole process of phase estimation and feedback, the phase post-compensation method can tolerate faster fluctuation,
as long as φδ does not change much in the time between the reference and quantum pulses.
In the security analysis of PM-QKD[13], due to the random phases Alice and Bob modulated on their coherent
states, the joint state can be decomposed into odd and even total photon number components, ρoddAB and ρ
even
AB . Denote
the proportions of detection caused by ρoddAB and ρ
even
AB as q
odd and qeven, respectively, and obviously, qodd + qeven = 1.
In fact, the information leakage in PM-QKD is shown to be independent of channel disturbance. As a result, the
privacy is only related to qeven, irrelevant to the bit error rate. The final key length is given by
K = Mµ[1−H(qevenµ )]− lcor, (1)
where H(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function. Here, we consider the case where Alice
and Bob use the same intensities of coherent states. The subscript µ represents the signal states with µa = µb = µ/2.
The raw key length Mµ is the number of detection events caused by signal states when Alice and Bob match their
phases, js = 0 or 8. The even photon component ratio q
even
µ can be efficiently estimated by decoy state methods[3–5].
4The error correction cost lcor can be usually estimated by a function of bit error rate Eµ, lcor = fMµH(Eµ), where
f is the error correction efficiency depending on Ejsµ . The key rate is defined by R = K/N , where N is the number
of QKD rounds. Details of the decoy state method and the security analysis by considering the finite data size effects
are presented in Appendix E.
In order to further improve the key rate, one can take advantage of the data with mismatched phases. Note that
the phase-mismatched signals of js = 1, 9 can be regarded as the ones with a fixed misalignment φδ = 2pi/D, which
results in a larger bit error rate compared with the phase-matched signals of js = 0, 8. The raw keys with different js
have the same qeven in Eq. (1) and hence the same privacy. More explicitly, Alice and Bob can categorize the data
from signal states into D/2 groups, where the data of js = 0, 8 are in the 0-th group, the data of js = 1, 9 are in the
1-st group, etc. Alice and Bob can correct errors in each data group separately and perform privacy amplification
altogether. Of course, if the error rate in a group is too large, they can simply discard that group of data.
We perform the experiment via 101, 201, 302, 402 km standard optical fibres and a 502 km ultralow-loss optical fibre.
The experiment parameters and results are presented in Fig. 3, from which one can see that the key rate-transmittance
relation follows R = O(
√
η) as a contrast with the linear rate-transmittance bound. Specifically, the experimental
results beat the linear bound at the distances of 302 and 402 km. Take the 302 km fibre case as an example, with
the same channel transmission and detection efficiency, the linear key-rate bound is given by Rup = 5.44× 10−7. Our
experiment yields a key rate of R = 6.74×10−7, with a failure probability of  = 1.68×10−10, when all the mismatched
data is used. The key rate is 24.0% higher than the bound. In the case of 302 km, the data with mismatched phases
has a significant contribution to the overall key rate, which is 72.6% larger than the value with only the phase-matched
group considered. Notably, our achieved key rate is three orders of magnitude higher than the asymptotic key rate of
the original MDI-QKD scheme[6].
Meanwhile, we obtain a positive key rate at 502 km experiment with an ultralow-loss optical fibre, beating the
current record of 421 km fibre communication distance of QKD[11]. The channel loss of 502 km experiment is 81.7
dB and the total loss is 87.1 dB. This new loss-tolerance record is comparable with the high-orbital satellite link loss
in free space.
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FIG. 3. Experimental parameters and results. a. Main panel, the experimental rate-distance performance of PM-QKD,
comparing with the theoretical expectation and the linear key rate bound [9]. The data points marked by cross and star are,
respectively, the key rate without and with the usage of phase-mismatched signals. Inset, error rate against total loss. The
solid line shows the bit error rate in the theoretical model, and the crosses show the experiment data. b. The bit error rate
with respect to the experiment time in the 302 km experiment. Each data point represents a number of 3.31 × 105 effective
clicks which are collected in 21.91 minutes on average. The blue dots and red dots show the bit error rate for data with phase
difference jd = 0 and 1, respectively. c. Parameters used in the experiment and theoretical simulation. Note that, the listed
value of the dark count rate pd, the detection efficiency ηd, misalignment error ed, and the fibre loss of PM-QKD are used for
numerical simulation. The corresponding experimental values depend on the specific environment, which are listed in Appendix
G.
5Our results show that PM-QKD system is stable and economical, which facilitates the promotion of practical QKD.
In the future, we expect to use the phase post-compensation technique to keep the system robust by increasing the
system repetition frequency and enhancing the detectors’ performance. Also, we expect that the design of PM-QKD
experiment will be helpful for the construction of quantum repeater[21, 22], as well as extending the reach of the
quantum internet.
FUNDING INFORMATION
This work has been supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (Grant No. 2017YFA0303903 and
No. 2017YFA0304000), the Chinese Academy of Science, the National Fundamental Research Program, the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 11875173, No. 61875182 and No. 11674193), Anhui Initiative in
Quantum Information Technologies, and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (WK2340000083).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge H. Zhou for the insightful discussions.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors contributed extensively to the work presented in this paper.
AUTHOR INFORMATION
Reprints and permissions information is available at www.nature.com/reprints. The authors declare no competing
financial interests. Readers are welcome to comment on the online version of this article at www.nature.com/nature.
Appendix A: Phase drift estimation
Rather than using extra devices to lock the phase, here we apply the phase estimation method to estimate the drifted
phase, as shown in Fig. 4. Here, Alice and Bob need not obtain the exact value of the real-time phase deviation φδ,
but only an estimation of the slice number jδ for post-compensation. Moreover, the estimation of jδ does not need
to be announced in a real-time manner. Instead, it can be announced during the sifting process, as a post-selection
shift factor. This makes our protocol practical without active feedback.
Loaded Phase: 0 Loaded Phase : 0 (π/2)
Next
Period
Quantum Reference Recover QuantumReference Recover
Previous
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EsƟmaƟon Period
FIG. 4. Phase estimation technique. The pulses with a repetition rate of 312.5 MHz are grouped into trains, each containing
625 pulses. The period of pulse trains is about 2 µs. In each train, there are two reference pulse regions and two quantum pulse
regions. Alice loads the 0 and pi/2 phase on her pulses in the former and latter reference pulse region, respectively. A recovery
region without pulses is at the end of every reference pulse region, where the detector systems recover to the optimal working
condition.
In the reference pulse region, Alice and Bob send reference pulses to Charlie, who interferes them and announces
the results. They use the interference results to estimate the phase slice difference between two reference pulses, φδ.
6The right detector click ratio Pr after interference is
nr
nr + nl
≈ Pr = 1 + cosφδ
2
, (A1)
where nr and nl are the counts of the right and left detector clicks, respectively. With this ratio, one can classify the
phase fluctuation φδ to the phase slices ∆jδ marked by jδ according to the detection ratio.
Note that, since the phase deviation φδ and (2pi − φδ) yield the same Pr, Alice and Bob cannot discriminate these
two cases from the ratio Pr. To solve this problem, Alice loads a φ0 = pi/2 phase on the pulses in the latter reference
pulse region, making the phase difference to be φδ + pi/2, and hence Pr =
1−sinφδ
2 . In that case, one can distinguish
the phase slice jδ from (16− jδ). With the interference results Pr from the case φ0 = 0 and φ0 = pi/2, Alice and Bob
can estimate jδ accurately, as shown in Fig. 5.
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FIG. 5. Phase estimation region. The blue, green, red and orange region denotes four phase quadrants ranging from
[0, pi/2), [pi/2, pi), [pi, 3pi/2), and [3pi/2, 2pi). The solid line shows the theoretic detection probability Pr with the initial phase
difference φ0 of the reference pulse is set to 0, while the dashed line shows Pr when φ0 = pi/2. From these two estimated Pr
values, one can infer the jδ value with no degeneracy.
In order to yield an accurate estimation of jδ, sufficient detection counts of the reference pulses are required.
According to the transmittance and phase drift velocity, one should properly set the intensity and time duration of
the reference pulse and the system repetition frequency.
Appendix B: Laser injection technique
The fluctuation of reference deviation φδ is mainly caused by three factors: the initial phase fluctuation of the
lasers, the optical length fluctuation, and the fluctuation of the laser frequencies. In order to minimize the fluctuation
caused by the first and the third factors, we apply the laser injection technique.
As shown in Fig. 6a, a narrow line-width continuous wave laser at Charlie side works as the master laser, while
DFB laser at Alice’s (same as Bob’s) side works as the slave laser. The seed light generated by the master laser is
divided into two parts and sent to the two slave lasers through long fibres, which induces stimulated emission. In this
case, the wavelength and phase of the light generated by the slave laser are the same as the seed light, which results
in slower fluctuation of laser initial phases. For a local experiment test, interference results of pulses generated by
slave lasers shows that the phase difference of two locked slave lasers fluctuates in a relatively low speed, which is
presented in Fig. 6b. Here, the residual phase noise and fluctuation mainly come from the spontaneous emission in
the slave lasers. Though the phase will fluctuate faster when the fibre gets longer, we can still get an effecive phase
estimation in this case.
In the 101, 201, 302 km experiments, the master laser is put at the middle point between Alice and Bob’s laser.
The fibres used to transmit seed light and the signal light are different but with the same length. Due to the limited
power of the master laser and low transmittance value, in the 402 km and 502 km experiments, we place the master
laser and the slave lasers locally.
Appendix C: PM-QKD protocol
In Box. C, we explicitly present the phase-matching quantum key distribution (PM-QKD) scheme implemented in
the experiment. We divide the phase space 0 ∼ 2pi into D slices and denote the j-th slice as ∆j = [ piD (2j−1), piD (2j+1)).
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FIG. 6. Laser injection technique and test. a. Schematic implementation. b. Local drift test of the phase difference φδ
with two local slave lasers. A statistic analysis on the detection data shows that the phase difference between the two locked
slave lasers drifts at 0.62 rad/ms.
The central phase of j-th slice is φj =
2pi
D j.
Suppose the phase references of Alice and Bob are different φ
(0)
a , φ
(0)
b . Moreover, we denote the phase variation in
the fibre as φf . Before Eve’s interference, the phase difference between Alice and Bob’s pulses is
(φa + φ
(0)
a )− (φb + φ(0)b ) + φf = φa − φb + (φ(0)a − φ(0)b + φf ) = φa − φb + φδ ≈ (ja − jb + jδ)
2pi
D
, (C1)
and hence the phase difference belongs to the (ja − jb + jδ)-th slice. Suppose φδ fluctuates slowly with respect to
time. By the interference of coherent pulses, Alice and Bob can estimate φδ accurately. In this case, for the data with
js = 0, the interference should be nearly perfect, with small quantum bit error rate. Note that, the sifting strategy
does not affect the security of PM-QKD. It only affects the error correction efficiency.
Appendix D: Experiment detail of PM-QKD
1. Laser injection details
As is shown in Fig. 7, the continuous wave emitted from the master laser (Realphoton Technology Ltd.) are split by
a PMBS and transmitted through long fibres and finally injected into Alice and Bobs slave laser (Agilecom Ltd.). To
achieve a good laser injection result, we apply the Erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) to amplify the light intensity
and the dense wavelength division multiplexer (DWDM) to filter the side band noise. After that, a fiber Bragg grating
(FBG) inserted before injection is used to block the light with unexpected wavelength. A photoelectric diode (PD)
is used to monitor the intensity of injection wave for avoiding that Charlie (or Eve) controls the output of the slave
laser by manipulate the injection wave. The optical pulses at the width of 400 ps generated by the slave laser.
2. Encoding and measurement devices
In accordance with random bit values generated beforehand, two Sagnac rings [23] (SR1-2) are employed to modulate
the intensities of reference state and three decoy states while two phase modulators (PM1-2) are employed to modulate
encoding phases and random phases. The circulator followed are utilized to prevent Trojan horse attack. Note that
the pulse into the SR is split into two pulses by the polarization-maintaining beam splitter (PMBS), one of which
travels clockwise and the other travels anticlockwise. The PM in the SR adjusts and loads the phase only on one
of the two pulses every round so that the output pulses intensity could be modulated when they meet again on the
PMBS. To avoid the disturbance on the encoding process, the backward output pulses will be removed by the Circ
8Box 1 | PM-QKD protocol
State preparation: Alice randomly generates a key bit κa, and picks a random phase φja from the
set {j 2pi
D
}D−1j=0 , and the intensity µia from the set {0, ν/2, µ/2}. She then prepares the coherent state
|√µiaei(φja+piκa)〉A. Similarly, Bob generates κb, φjb , µib and then prepares |
√
µibe
i(φjb+piκb)〉
B
.
Measurement: Alice and Bob send their optical pulses, A and B, to an untrusted party, Eve, who is expected
to perform an interference measurement and record the detector (L or R) that clicks.
Announcement: Eve announces her detection results. Then, Alice and Bob announce the random phases
and intensities ja, µia and jb, µib , respectively.
Phase estimation: From time to time, Alice and Bob generate strong coherent pulses with φja = φjb = 0
and send to Eve. Eve is supposed to interfere these pulses and estimate the phase difference φδ between these
two pulses. Eve announces the phase slice number jδ of φδ.
Alice and Bob repeat the above steps for N times. After that, they perform the following data post-processing
procedures.
Sifting: When Eve announces a successful detection, (a click from exactly one of the detectors L or R), Alice
and Bob keep κa and κb. Bob flips his key bit κb if Eve’s announcement was an R click. Then, Alice and Bob
group the signals by js = (ja− jb + jδ) mod D. If js ∈ [D4 , 3D4 ), Bob flips his key bit κb. After that, Alice and
Bob merge the data with js and js +
D
2 , with js = 0, 1, ...,
D
2 − 1.
Parameter estimation: For all the raw data that they have retained, Alice and Bob record the detect
number M
(js)
ia,ib
of different intensity combinations {µia , µib} and phase group js. They then estimate the
phase error number among all the clicked signal rounds nXµ in the phase group js using the methods in Section
E 2.
Key distillation: For the signals with µia = µib =
µ
2 , Alice and Bob group them by the phase difference js.
They then perform error correction and error verification on the raw key data of each group js, respectively.
They then perform privacy amplification on the sifted key bits to generate private key.
(circulator) in the SR. Because of the same fiber in which two pulses travel, the clockwise and counter-clockwise paths
are insensitive to any length drifts or stress and temperature variation of the fiber within propagation time. In that
case, the SR is so stable that the intensity feedback device is unnecessary.
In Charlie’s measurement device, to make sure that the polarization of two pulses are indistinguishable, we utilize
two PBSs before interfere to filter unexpected part. The reflection port of each PBS is monitored by the SNSPD
with detection efficiency of 20% and dark count rate of 100 cps. Charlie adjusts the DC loaded in the EPC in real
time to minimize and stabilize the detection count of SNSPD so the incident pulses intensity for interfere maintains
maximum. Note that since we have to send strong reference pulses which is described in Appendix A, we always have
enough pulses intensity for the polarization feedback system even the fiber length is up to 500 km, and Our feedback
system works well with less than 1% loss of the incident pulse intensity.
The detector efficiency of SNSPD1 and SNSPD2 is about 40% in 101, 201, 302 and 402 km experiments, while in
502 km experiment, we enhance the efficiency of two detectors to 46% and 75% for better performance. To get a
higher interference visibility, we set a 25% non-overlap between the signal and detection window. The insertion loss
of Charlie’s measurement device is about 1.2 dB.
3. Synchronization systems
The entire system are synchronized by two arbitrary-function generators (Tektronix, AFG3253) which is not shown
in Fig. 1. Three 100 KHz electric signals in phase are modulated by two arbitrary-function generators. The delay
between any two of them is adjustable. Alice, Bob and Charlie use one of them to regenerate their own 312.5 MHz
system clock, respectively. To overlap the independent signal pulses from Alice and Bob precisely, we need to develop
the time calibration system. First, Charlie measures the arriving time of the optical pulses from Alice and Bob with
a time-to-digital converter (TDC), respectively. Then she adjusts the time delay between the electric signals from
9PMBS1
SNSPD1
SNSPD2
ML
PMBS2
Charlie
EDFA
DWDM
DWDM
Circ1
Circ2
Circ1
Circ2
FBG
FBG
SL
SL
Bob
Alice
QKD
Seed Light
QKD
PMBS
PD
SS1
SS2PMBS
PD
Encoder
Encoder
EDFA
E
FIG. 7. Detailed setting of PM-QKD with the nonlocal laser locking system.
the arbitrary-function generator according to the calculation of the averaged arriving time. Due to the long optical
fiber length drifting, we have to proceed a time calibration every 30 minutes. The total timing calibration precision
is about 20 ps which is precise enough for the implement.
Appendix E: Finite-size parameter estimation
Here we list the formulas to estimate the key length K, the phase error number, and the corresponding failure
probability. The detailed finite-size security analysis of PM-QKD is in Ref. [24].
1. Key length formula
In the experimental PM-QKD protocol introduced in Appendix C, Alice and Bob group the signals by the phase
difference js. For the signals in group js, the key length is
K(js) = M (js)µ [1−H(qeven(js)µ )]− l(js)cor , (E1)
where Mµ(js) is the clicked rounds when Alice and Bob both send out signal lights with µia = µib = µ/2 in the group
js. q
even(js)
µ is the estimated fraction caused by the even state
qeven(js)µ =
M
even(js)
µ
M
(js)
µ
, (E2)
where M
even(js)
µ is clicked rounds caused by even photon component in the M
(js)
µ with estimation method introduced
in Appendix E 2.
The error correction cost, given by l
(js)
cor , can usually by estimated by a function of bit error rate E
(js)
µ among the
signals of group js,
l(js)cor = fM
(js)
µ H(E
(js)
µ ), (E3)
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where f is the error correction efficiency, determined by the error rate E
(js)
µ and the specific error correction method.
If E
(js)
µ is too large, the cost l
(js)
cor may be larger than the generated key length M
(js)
µ (1−H(qeven(js)µ )). In this case,
Alice and Bob directly abandon this group of data.
The overall key length for all the phase group js is
K =
D/2−1∑
js=0
max
js
{K(js), 0}. (E4)
Note that, the information leakage is only related to the fraction q
even(js)
µ , irrelevant to the bit error rate. Therefore,
the overall information leakage depends on the even photon component in the clicked signals for all the phase group.
In practice, the data post-processing procedure can be improved. Alice and Bob can first perform error correction
separately, with respect to different phase group js. If the error rate is too large, they can simply discard that group
of data. Denote the group set J to be the set of group indeces {js} where the data is left. That is, if js ∈ J , then
the phase group js is kept for key generation. For all the left phase groups in set J , Alice and Bob estimate the even
photon fraction q
even(J)
µ . They then perform privacy amplification among the left data altogether. Of course, Alice
and Bob should properly set the group set J to maximize the key length.
With the improved post-processing procedure, the key length for the left phase groups is
K = M (J)µ [1−H(qeven(J)µ )]− f
∑
js∈J
M (js)µ H(E
(js)
µ ), (E5)
where M
(J)
µ , q
even(J)
µ are, respectively, the clicked rounds and estimated even photon fractions for the left data.
2. Decoy-state estimation
The core of parameter estimation step is to estimate the phase error number M
even(J)
µ in the signal state group set
J with µa = µb = µ/2. According to the security analysis in Ref. [24], M
even(J)
µ is bounded by
Meven(J)µ = 1−
∑
k:odd
M
s(J)
k ≥ 1−Ms(J)1 , (E6)
where M
s(js)
k is the k-photon clicked number in the group set J of signal lights.
In experimental PM-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob set the signal, weak decoy and vacuum light with preset ratio
rs, rw, rvac. To estimate M
s(J)
1 , Alice and Bob perform the following decoy-state process,
1. To record the sending round number when Alice and Bob both send out signal, weak decoy or vacuum pulses,
denoted as {Ns, Nw, Nvac}; and the number of according single-clicked rounds (including the rounds with error),
denoted as {Ms,Mw,Mvac}.
2. Based on an inversed usage of Chernoff bound introduced in Appendix E 3, to calculate {EU (M¯a),EL(M¯a)}a,
where a = s, w, vac as signal, weak decoy and vacuum pulse, and estimate the failure probability 1. Calculate
the {EU (Q¯a),EL(Q¯a)}a by
Q¯a∗ =
M¯a
Na
. (E7)
3. Calculate the minimal Y ∗L1 based on {EU (Q¯a∗),EL(Q¯a∗)}a and the following formula,
Y¯ ∗1 ≥ Y¯ ∗L1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(
EL[Q¯w∗]eν − EU [Q¯s∗]eµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
EU [Q¯vac∗]
)
, (E8)
calculate M¯Lk by
M¯k = N
∞
k Y¯
∗
k , (E9)
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where
N∞k = N
∑
a
P a(k)(ra)2, (E10)
are the asymptotic rounds of sending pulses with photon number k. P a(k) is the Poisson distribution when the
intensity setting is a.
4. Based on a direct usage of Chernoff bound introduced in Appendix E 3, to calculate (M
s(J)
1 )
L and estimate the
failure probability 2.
As a result, Alice and Bob can obtain an lower bound estimation of M
s(J)
1 with failure probability 1 + 2. From
Eq. (E6), we can bound the phase error number M
even(J)
µ .
3. Chernoff-Hoeffding bound
Here we present the methods to evaluate E(M¯a) from Ma and evaluate Ms1 from M1 using Chernoff bounds.
To evaluate E(M¯a) from Ma, we inversely use the Chernoff bounds based on Bernoulli variables. We briefly
summarize the results in Ref. [25]. For the observed value χ, we set the lower and upper bound of estimated E(χ) as
{EL(χ),EU (χ)}. Denote
EL(χ) =
χ
1 + δL
,
EU (χ) =
χ
1− δU .
(E11)
The failure probability of the estimation E(χ) ∈ [EL(χ),EU (χ)], given by the Chernoff bound, is
 = e−χg2(δ
L) + e−χg2(δ
U ), (E12)
where g2(x) = ln(1 + x)− x/(1 + x).
To evaluate Ms1 from M1, we directly apply the Chernoff bounds. Suppose the direct sampling expectation value
of Ms1 is given by E(Ms1 ) = ps1M1. For the expected value E(χ), we set the lower and upper bound of the estimated
χ as {χL, χU}. Denote
χL = (1− δ¯L)E(χ),
χU = (1 + δ¯U )E(χ).
(E13)
The failure probability of the estimation χ ∈ [χL, χU ], given by the Chernoff bound, is
 = e−(δ¯
L)2E(χ)/(2+δ¯L) + e−(δ¯
U )2E(χ)/(2+δ¯U ). (E14)
In practice, we can preset the lower bound and upper bound {EL(χ),EU (χ)} or {χL, χU} by assuming a Gaussian
distribution on χ first,
EL(χ) = χ− nα√χ, EU (χ) = χ+ nα√χ,
χL = χ− nα
√
E(χ), χU = χ+ nα
√
E(χ),
(E15)
where nα is a preset parameter to determine the estimation precision. After that, we calculate the failure probabilities
by Eq. (E12) and Eq. (E14).
Appendix F: Simulation formulas and detailed results
Here we list the formulas used to simulate the key rate of PM-QKD and MDI-QKD in Fig. 3 in Main Text. The
channel is modeled to be a pure loss one and symmetric for Alice and Bob with transmittance η (wit the detector
efficiency ηd) taken into account.
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1. Gain, yield and error rate of PM-QKD
In PM-QKD, the k-photon the yield Yk is ( Eq. (B13) in Ref. [13])
Yk ≈ 1− (1− 2pd)(1− η)k, (F1)
and the gain Qµ when µa = µb = µ/2, is ( Eq. (B14) in Ref. [13])
Qµ ≈ 1− (1− 2pd)e−ηµ. (F2)
The even signal fraction qevenµ is bounded by
qevenµ ≤ 1− Y1. (F3)
For the coherent lights with intensities µa − µb = µ/2 and phase difference φa − φb = φδ, the bit error rate is (
Eq. (B21) in Ref. [13] )
EZµ (φδ) ≈
e−ηµ
Qµ
[pd + ηµ sin
2(
φδ
2
)]. (F4)
In the simulation in Fig. 3 in Main Text, we directly set ed(0) = 5.3% and only consider the data with matched
phases. The bit error rate is,
EZµ (0) ≈ [pd + ηµed(0)]
e−ηµ
Qµ
. (F5)
2. Simulation formulas for MDI-QKD protocols
The key rate of MDI-QKD is [6]
RMDI =
1
2
{Q11[1−H(e11)]− fQrectH(Erect)}, (F6)
where Q11 = µaµbe
−µa−µbY11 and 1/2 is the basis sifting factor. We take this formula from Eq. (B27) in Ref. [20]. In
simulation, the gain and error rates are given by
Y11 = (1− pd)2[ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pd + 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2d],
e11 = e0Y11 − (e0 − ed)(1− p2d)
ηaηb
2
,
Qrect = Q
(C)
rect +Q
(E)
rect,
Q
(C)
rect = 2(1− pd)2e−µ
′/2[1− (1− pd)e−ηaµa/2][1− (1− pd)e−ηbµb/2],
Q
(E)
rect = 2pd(1− pd)2e−µ
′/2[I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−µ′/2];
ErectQrect = edQ
(C)
rect + (1− ed)Q(E)rect,
(F7)
Here,
µ′ = ηaµa + ηbµb,
x =
1
2
√
ηaµaηbµb,
(F8)
where µ′ denotes the average number of photons reaching Eve’s beam splitter, and µa = µb = µ/2, ηa = ηb = η. We
take these formulas from Eqs. (A9), (A11), (B7), and (B28)-(B31) in Ref. [20].
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In 2014, Takeoka et al. derived an upper bound of the key rate of the point-to-point-type QKD protocols [8],
RTGW = − log2(
1− η
1 + η
). (F9)
Later, Pirandola et al. established a tight upper bound [9],
RPLOB = − log2(1− η), (F10)
which is the linear key-rate bound used in Main Text.
Appendix G: Experimental data
Here we list the experiment data for reference. Table I and II illustrate the data for theoretical parameters, channel
condition and the key length calculation. Table III show the sending and received statistics of all the signals. Table IV
and Table V shows the detailed data of 101 km experiment with different phase slices setting.
TABLE I. Parameter setting
Error correction efficiency 1.1
Failure probability ∼ 1.7× 10−10
Fluctuation factor 7
TABLE II. Channel condition and key generation
Distance (km) 101 201 302 402 502
Channel loss 1.02E-1 1.05E-2 1.29E-3 1.91E-4 8.18E-5
detection loss 23% 23% 23% 20% 29%
Total loss(double side) 2.40E-03 2.53E-05 3.77E-07 7.34E-09 1.96E-09
Dark count 2.29E-07 5.85E-08 7.75E-08 3.36E-08 1.26E-08
PLOB bound 3.47E-03 3.66E-05 5.44E-07 1.06E-08 2.82E-09
intensity of decoy state(single side) 0.0179 0.0182 0.0192 0.0177 0.0127
intensity of signal state(single side) 0.0358 0.0364 0.0384 0.0353 0.0253
Sending rounds 1010250633000 1001472066000 20000133132000 19996635312500 20003396875000
Aligned bit error rate 5.31% 5.75% 6.06% 7.00% 9.80%
Key length 98957100 6502240 13479300 287710 33674
Aligned key length 48529900 3440190 7809030 287710 33674
Expandsion factor 2.04 1.89 1.73 1.00 1.00
Failure probablity 1.68E-10 1.67E-10 1.68E-10 1.69E-10 1.71E-10
Key Rate(bps) 2.06E+04 1.36E+03 9.44E+01 2.01E+00 1.18E-01
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